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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm the order
of the lower court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 29, 1975, an incident occurred in Tooele
County which lead investigating authorities to believe that a
theft of Mountain Bell wire had taken place.

The following day,

one William Holton was arrested on a charge of "grand larceny,"
(R-24-26,36).

His attorney contacted the then deputy county

attorney for Tooele County and was advised that no charges would
be

filedagains~

the respondent because there was not sufficient

evidence to prosecute him,

(R-53).

Although no such facts appear in the record of this case
to support its allegations, the appellant has claimed that on
September 30, 1975, a complaint was filed against Holton, charging him with theft,

(appellant's brief, p.2).

The appellant

also alleges that after a series of continuances, Holton waived
his right to a preliminary examination, entered a plea of guilty
to a lesser offense, and as part of plea negotiations agreed to
give a statement implicating the respondent in the purported
theft,

(id.).

On the basis of that statement, according to the

appellant, a complaint was issued on July 11, 1978, three months
after the statement was given, and a warrant of arrest was issued,
(R-5 and R-6) .
The respondent was arrested in Wyoming on June 22, 1979.
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The appellant has not contested the fact that for a portion of
the time between the September 29, 1975 incident and the arrest
on June 22, 1979, the respondent resided outside of Utah,
pellant's brief, p.6).

(ap-

The appellant has also conceded that

during part of the time he was a non-resident the respondent
was incarcerated,

(T-7).

The respondent made a motion to dismiss the charge
against him on the ground that the state unreasonably delayed
in bringing his prosecution to trial,

(R-55).

At the time the

motion was made, the whereabouts of Holton, the principal witness against the respondent, were unknown (R-40).
hearing, the court granted the motion,

After a

(T-11). Although the

appellant's brief makes reference to a minute order granting the
motion,

(appellant's brief, p.6), none appears in the record

filed with this Court.

The written order of dismissal signed

by the court was prepared by the Tooele County Attorney,

(R-

inside cover) .
A R G U ME N T
POINT

I

THE TOOELE COUNTY ATTORNEY LACKS AUTHORITY TO
BRING THIS APPEAL.
The powers of the county attorneys in the State of Utah
are those prescribed by law, Art. VIII, Sec. 10, Constitution
of Utah.

The legislature enumerated and described those powers

in Section 17-18-1,

(all statutory references are to Utah Code

Annotated unless otherwise noted) .

Nowhere in that section was
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the power given to county attorneys to prosecute appeals in the
Utah Supreme Court.
The power of the county attorney to appear in the Supreme Court is limited to rendering, " ... such assistance as
may be required by the attorney general in all such cases that
may be appealed to the Supreme Court," Section 17-18-1 (3). The
primary responsibility for prosecuting appeals in the Supreme
Court would appear to be with the attorney·

general.

It is

his duty, "[t]o attend the Supreme Court of this state ... and
prosecute or defend all causes to which the state ... is a
party;" Section 67-5-1(1).
In the present case, the Tooele County Attorney has exceeded the bounds of its statutory authority.

It has not been

"required by the attorney general to give assistance," in this
appeal, rather, it has usurped the statutory function of the
attorney general by filing a brief in this Court.

The New

Mexico Supreme Court was presented with a similar problem in
State v. Aragon, 55 N.M. 431, 234 P.2d 356 (1950).
At the time of the Aragon decision, New Mexico had a
statute which, like Section 67-5-1 (1), provided that the attorney general should have prosecuted and def ended

all cases in

the Supreme Court, Section 3-302 in Laws of New Mexico, 1941
compilation.

The New Mexico Supreme Court accepted the respon-

dent's contention that the duty to "prosecute" included taking
an appeal and in response to the respondent's challenge to the
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authority of a district attorney to take an appeal, held
" ... the District Attorney had the authority to take the appeal
but ... it is the prerogative and duty of the Attorney General
to brief the case and present it in this court, and a District
Attorney may only appear here in a criminal case by permission
of the Attorney General and in association with him ....

The

motion to strike the brief of the District Attorney will be
granted," 234 P.2d 356,358.
This Court should adopt the ruling of the New Mexico
Supreme Court and dismiss the brief filed by the Tooele County
Attorney.

If it does not, the result will encourage other

county attorneys to prosecute appeals of their own and, consequently could result in as many different approaches to one
question of law as there are county attorneys.

The consolida-

tion of the power to appear in the Supreme Court in one office,
the attorney general, hopefully would lend more consistency to
the appellate process.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
ITS DISCRETION IN DISMISSING THE CHARGE.
Under Section 77-51-4, a trial court of this state,
II

may ... of its own motion ... in furtherance of justice

order an action, information or indictment to be dismissed."
Respondent sought to have the lower court invoke its power by
making a motion to dismiss for undue delay on the part of the
-5Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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prosecution.

It is his contention that the lower court prop-

erly exercised its discretion in dismissing the case.
After the alleged theft and the filing of a complaint
against Holton, some three years passed before his ostensible
confession which implicated the respondent.

Inexplicably,

with the case "resolved" against Holton, another three months
passed before a complaint and arrest warrant for the respondent
issued.
Wyoming.

In the interim, the respondent had taken up living in
Another year passed and he was arrested there to face

a four year-old case which, according to the appellant, could
not have been filed prior to Holton's confession,
brief, p.12).

(appellant's

Yet, as trial approached the appellant was unaware

of Holton's whereabouts.

Without Holton's presence, his con-

fession implicating the respondent would be inadmissible under
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence, and Bruton v. United States,
391

u. s.

123 (1968).

If Holton was somehow to have been pro-

duced for a trial, his testimony as an accomplice, under the law
in effect at the time of the offense, would have required corroboration.

In addition to these factors, the court was re-

quired to weigh the expense in time and money to the parties
if this litigation was to continue as well as the propriety of
consuming scarce judicial resources with a case of this age and
nature.

While there may be those who would disagree with the

lower court's decision, a fair consideration of the preceding
factors could hardly lead to the conclusion that its decision
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was an abuse of discretion.
Appellant nevertheless argues that because the court
failed to specify its reasons for the dismissal in its order,
the order should be dismissed, and Salt Lake City v. Hanson,
19

u.

2d 32, 425 P.2d 773 (1967)

is cited as support for that

proposition. This contention contains two fatal flaws.
The order in this case was prepared by the appellant
and it is now the appellant who seeks to attack the very order
it prepared.

It would seem ludicrous to permit the appellant

to complaint of defects in the order.

This court should apply

a construction to the order similar to what it would apply if
it was a contract, that "language in a written instrument is
interpreted more strongly against a scrivener who executes it,
Skousen v. Smith, 27 U.2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972). The appellant, having chosen to prepare the order, should now be estopped
from attacking it.

A contrary decision would permit any dis-

gruntled party to bring a successful appeal through the procedural artifice of filing a flawed order.
If the Court permits the appellant to assail the order,
it nevertheless should be sustained because the reasons it was
granted are clear.

Salt Lake City v. Hanson is cited by the

appellant as authority for the proposition that unless the
judge granting an order of dismissal specifies the reasons for
the dismissal his order is improper.
the present case.

Hanson does not apply to

In Hanson, although the Court disapproved
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the lower court's entry of an order of dismissal without
specifying its reasons, the Supreme Court did not appear to
reverse the lower court on that grounds.

Rather, the Court

fully discussed the two reasons orally advanced by the lower
court for its order and found them to be insufficient justifications for a dismissal.

Further, the concurring opinion of

Justice Ellett in the Hanson case at 425 P.2d 776, discloses
another factor distinguishing it from this appeal.

There the

trial judge is quoted as saying upon entering the order of dismissal that he is qbout to give someone "the shock of their
life."

Where no warning is given it would be a benefit to both

parties to know the reasons for the dismissal.
This appeal sharply contrasts with the Hanson case.
Here no one received the "shock of their life."

The reasons

for which the respondent sought to have the lower court invoke
its discretion to dismiss the case were spelled out in writing
in specific detail and were reiterated at the hearing on the
motion to dismiss the case.

The rule is that, "an order will

not be contrued as going beyond the motion in pursuance of
which it is given," Attorney General of Utah v. Pomeroy, 73 P.2d
1277 (Utah 1937).

Thus, although the appellant chose not to

state the reasons for the dismissal in the order it prepared
for the court's signature, there is no great mystery as to why
the order was granted.

It was granted for the reasons suggested
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by the respondent in his motion and argument.
Pomeroyrul~

Under the

those are the only reasons the order could have

been based upon.

Therefore, the concern of the Hanson case,

that, "the judge who assumes the serious responsibility of
dismissing a case [be required] to set forth his reasons for
doing so in order that all may know what invokes the court's
discretion and whether its action is justified," 425 P.2d 773,
775, has been met.

The reasons for the invocation of the

court's discretion are clear.

The order should be upheld.

POINT III
RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS MANDATES A
DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE.
If this Court concludes that the lower court judge
acted beyond the bounds of his discretion in dismissing the
charges in the interests of justice under Section 77-51-4, it
nevertheless should affirm the dismissal because permitting
the prosecution to proceed would violate the respondent's constitutional rights to due process of law.
In United State v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971), it was
held that the constitutional right to a speedy trial does not
take effect until an accusation or arrest has been made.

How-

ever, it was also said that if an accused could show actual
prejudice resulting from a delay between the alleged offense
and his arrest, the trial court in the exercise of its discre-
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tion, could dismiss the prosecution on due process grounds.
In the present case, the actual prejudice to the defendant
is apparent.
As noted, four years passed between the alleged incident and respondent's arrest.

He had been told no charges

would be filed against him, consequently no effort was made
to locate witnesses in his behalf.

He has no idea where his

alleged accomplice turned accuser is located so his attorneys
cannot interview him.

If the Tooele County Attorney had timely

filed.its case it would now be long over.

Further, if it had

filed the case during or before the time the respondent was
incarcerated, he could have and would have demanded the disposition of the charges pursuant to Section 77-65-4, u.c.A.
(1953).

Appellant's delay in filing deprived him of his right

to a disposition.
The actual prejudice to the respondent from the delay
in charging him is readily apparent.

The lower court's dis-

missal was an appropriate recognition of his right to due process.

CONCLUSION
The Court should consider striking the brief filed by
the Tooele County Attorney because he has exceeded his authority
in taking that action.

If it does not do so, it should affirm

the lower court's order dismissing

-10-

the prosecution as a proper
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exercise of that court's discretion.
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